Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO by Perez, Oren
MULTIPLE REGIMES, ISSUE LINKAGE, AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: EXPLORING THE ROLE
OF THE WTO
OREN PEREZ*
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") has been heavily criti-
cized since its inception for its potentially destructive influence on
other policy domains, particularly environmental and labor poli-
cies. The public debate with respect to the WTO was structured, to
a large extent, by this negative stance. "Linkage" emerged over the
last decade as an alternative framework for thinking about the rela-
tionship between the WTO and other international regimes. The
narrative of linkage replaces the themes of conflict and animosity
which have dominated the "trade and -" debate, with a tale of
synergy and mutual support. The linkage literature highlights the
potential positive role that the WTO can play in the facilitation of
cooperation in other policy domains (e.g., environmental protec-
tion). This Article questions the validity of this emerging dis-
course, setting it against the complex reality of the contemporary
international system.
The Article starts with an exposition of the linkage thesis, ex-
ploring its theoretical underpinnings. The idea of linkage emerged
as a response to the problem of managing global dilemmas in an
anarchic world that is governed by weak and fragmented interna-
tional institutions. Linkage can help in coping with this govern-
ance "deficit" by unleashing hidden synergies between regimes,
thereby creating more effective governance structures. While the
idea that cross-regime linkage may yield synergistic benefits is in-
tuitively compelling, it suffers from several blind spots, which
make its actual feasibility doubtful. The Article exposes these
blind spots by situating the "linkage" hypothesis in a richer theo-
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retical framework, which recognizes the institutional complexities
and cleavages that characterize the contemporary international
system. Realizing the synergistic potential of cross-regime linkage
requires policymakers to develop workable responses to these
blind spots.
The Article then moves to examine the question of linkage in
the context of the WTO, exploring the extent to which the law of
the WTO accepts the linkage narrative as a legitimate policy choice,
and highlighting the barriers facing linkage within the WTO. The
study of the WTO focuses on the relationship between this regime
and environmental regimes. The Article considers several policy
responses to these difficulties, outlining several institutional
mechanisms that should facilitate the creation of mutually reinforc-
ing links between the trade and environment domains. The Article
concludes with an assessment of the future prospects of the linkage
idea in the WTO, in view of the principles set out in the 2001 Doha
Ministerial Declaration and the negotiations that took place within
the WTO before the 2005 Hong Kong Summit.
Ultimately, the Article seeks to develop a richer theoretical
framework for thinking about cross-regime linkage, by juxtaposing
the theoretical analysis of linkage with a deep analysis of the socio-
legal reality of the contemporary international arena, and the insti-
tutions governing it. This richer framework is necessary for devel-
oping more feasible policy recommendations. While the Article fo-
cuses on the trade-environment nexus, its conclusions are relevant
to other domains.
1. THE LINKAGE THESIS
1.1. Exposition: Fragmentation and Association
The current international legal sphere is extremely fragmented.
Different policy issues are dealt with by distinct and highly com-
partmentalized legal regimes. Each regime has its own legal and
political institutions that control the negotiation process within its
boundaries and govern its dispute settlement process. While there
is a certain degree of institutional consolidation between regimes,
this remains the exception. Two examples from the environmental
realm could illustrate this point. The United Nations Environment
Programme ("UNEP") has some coordinating authority over the
operation of several environmental treaties; however, this author-
ity is highly limited and the executive and legal authority ulti-
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mately lies at the hands of the secretariats and conferences of the
parties of each treaty.' Similarly, while many treaties mention the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") as their chosen "arbiter," the
court's authority is very restricted, and depends almost universally
on the discretion of the disputing parties (the parties have to de-
clare whether they agree to subject themselves to the ICJ's author-
ity).2
This fragmented picture does not reflect the deep linkages that
actually exist between various international regimes. These link-
ages reflect two key features of the international realm. First, the
"players" associated with these regimes are drawn from a common
pool. Irrespective of one's view of the identity of these players-
whether one takes a Westphalian perspective which views states as
the main players within the international arena, or a more complex
standpoint which recognizes the role of other players-there are
broad commonalities in the identity of players across different re-
gimes. These commonalities open various paths for cooperation
across regimes, which will be pursued below. Second, there are
also links at the "issue level." At this level there can be two types
of links. The first type is "legal": it reflects the fact that different
regimes may have overlapping jurisdictions. The second type is
"tangible": it reflects the fact that actions in one domain may have
an effect (economic, social, or ecological) in another domain.
To illustrate this typology of linkages let us examine the rela-
tion between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol. Consider first how
the two regimes could "meet" at the legal plane. The new compli-
ance arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol, which were negotiated at
the seventh Conference of the Parties, include as part of their sanc-
tioning repertoire a potential trade sanction. An Annex I Party (a
party that undertook emission reduction obligations under the Pro-
tocol)3 that has not complied with its emission targets may be
1 See Bharat H. Desai, Mapping the Future of International Environmental Gov-
ernance, 13 Y.B. INT'L. ENvTL. L. 43, 51 (2002) (describing the powers of United Na-
tions Environment Programme ("UNEP")); Achim Steiner, Lee A. Kimball & John
Scanlon, Global Governance for the Environment and the Role of Multilateral Environ-
mental Agreements in Conservation, 37 ORYX 227, 232 (2003) (discussing the
autonomous decisionmaking authority of the conferences of the parties).
2 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity art. 27, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143, 31 I.L.M. 818; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 14, May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
3 For a list of Annex I parties, see Climate Change Convention, supra note 2,
annex I.
2005]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
barred from "selling" emission reduction units ("ERUs") under the
Protocol's emissions trading scheme. 4 This sanction interferes with
the trading relations between the parties and thus may be seen as
incompatible with the "most-favored nation" ("MFN") non-
discrimination principle.5 Another potential dispute could arise
from an attempt to use trade measures to enforce participation in,
or compliance with, the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. Such be-
havior would clearly fall under the jurisdiction of the WTO, and
would probably be considered incompatible with the WTO's basic
principles. 6
But the linkage between the domains is not confined to the le-
gal plane. The accelerated growth triggered by trade liberalization
is also likely to raise emissions of CO2, increasing the likelihood of
a climate change crisis, and making it more difficult for Annex I
parties to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
7
4 It may be subject to additional penalties. For further details on the compli-
ance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, see the website of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyotomechan-
isms/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). See also Conference
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
6th Sess., pt. 2, Bonn, F.R.G., July 18-27, 2001, Decisions Concerning Procedures and
Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, art. 14(5), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/2/Add.6 (June 11, 2001), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02a06.pdf.
5 Whether the Most-Favored Nation principle ("MFN") applies to trade in
emission reduction units ("ERUs") depends primarily on the proper classification
of these units, i.e., whether they could be seen as "goods" for World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") purposes. The opinions on that question are varied, al-
though most observers tend not to classify ERUs as goods. Wiser, for example,
argues that ERUs should be properly viewed as a kind of license that confers, "a
future right to pollute." From a legal perspective a license, he argues, is not a
good. Glenn M. Wiser, Frontiers in Trade: The Clean Development Mechanism and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2 INT'L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. IssuEs 288, 295
(2002). For a different view, exploring the idea of classifying ERUs as "investment
goods," see Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 185, 201-02 (1999).
6 A recent article in the Newstatesman reported that Pascal Lamy, the outgo-
ing European Union trade commissioner, and the current Director of the WTO,
hinted that "the European Union feels within its rights to use economic measures
against the United States" because the U.S. failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol
could be considered as an indirect subsidy to American producers, especially
those in fossil fuel-intensive industries. Andrew Sinuns, Bush Faces Trade Sanc-
tions, NEWSTATESMAN, Nov. 15, 2004, at 18. Using such measures (e.g., counter-
vailing duties) will probably be considered incompatible with the rules of the
World Trade Organization. Arguably one can try to justify such measures under
Article XX. On this question, see also discussion infra Section 3.2.
7 For a study of the link between trade liberalization and global CO2 emis-
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Similar questions arise in the context of the relationship between
the WTO and other environmental treaties such as the Basel Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Waste of 1989.8 The question is what should be the policy re-
sponse to the mismatch between the fragmented structure of the
global legal system and the social reality in which it is embedded?
In thinking about this dilemma, it is important to bear in mind that
the various regimes that populate the global legal system are not
symmetrical. International economic institutions are much more
powerful in terms of their resources and political and legal influ-
ence than other regimes. Global environmental institutions such as
UNEP and the secretariats of major environmental treaties, suffer
in that respect from enduring weakness.9
The policy dilemma seems to be clear: how to restructure the
fragmented global legal infrastructure in order to achieve a better
fit between the law and the underlying global reality. At a very
general level this challenge calls for the development of cross-
regime sensitivities. Such sensitivities should allow the segregated
regimes to take into account-in the course of their normal opera-
tions-the impact of actions taking place within their boundaries
on other domains. In the trade and environment context, this call
for concurrent sensitization is also motivated by the enduring in-
sensitivity of the global economic system to the adverse ecological
effects of rapid trade liberalizations.10
sions, see M.A. Cole, A.J. Rayner, & J.M. Bates, Trade Liberalisation and the Envi-
ronment: The Case of the Uruguay Round, 21 WORLD ECON. 337, 342-44 (1998).
8 For a discussion of a possible collision between the rules of the WTO and
those of the Basel Convention and other multilateral environmental treaties, see
generally the collection of articles published by the Heinrich Boll Foundation,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, THE WTO, AND MEAs: FACETS OF A COMPLEX
RELATIONSHIP (Lane Schalatek ed., 2001), available at http://www.boell.org
/docs/WTO-MEA.pdf. See also Robyn Eckersley, The Big Chill: The WATO and
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 24 (2004).
9 For a discussion of the weakness of transnational environmental institu-
tions, see John Whalley & Ben Zissimos, An Internalisation-Based World Environ-
mental Organisation, 25 WORLD ECON. 619, 620 (2002).
10 See, e.g., OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM: RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT 65-108 (2004)
(discussing the tension between trade policies and environmental protection);
Alejandro Nadal & Timothy A. Wise, The Environmental Costs of Agricultural Trade
Liberalization: Mexico-U.S. Maize Trade Under NAFTA 9-27 (Working Group on
Dev. & Env't in the Americas, Discussion Paper No. 4, 2004), available at
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP04NadalWiseJuly4.pdf (examining the
environmental impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
on the United States and Mexico and focusing on the transformation of the maize
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Responding to this dilemma requires the development of con-
crete institutional and discursive mechanisms that would enable
the development of cross-regime sensitivities. The idea of regime
linkage provides an interesting response to this challenge. The
concept of linkage does not focus on minimizing cross-regime ex-
ternalities but rather on exploiting potential synergies between re-
gimes. In the specific context of the trade and environment con-
flict, the linkage thesis questions the role that the WTO can play in
facilitating broader cooperation toward the resolution of global en-
vironmental dilemmas. The argument that the trade and environ-
mental realms may be mutually supportive can be found in several
international instruments such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development and Agenda 21.11 However, these in-
struments provide abstract formulations that do not provide real
guidance as to how such potential synergy may be unleashed.
12
The following Section explores in more detail the linkage thesis,
the theoretical insights underlying it, and the institutional mecha-
nisms it envisions.
1.2. The Argument for Linkage
The argument for linkage is based on three key insights regard-
ing the difficulties of resolving global dilemmas. First, achieving
collective solutions to global dilemmas is in many cases difficult
because of their public-good characteristics. Negotiating a collec-
market). Over the last few years there have been some indications of a deeper ac-
knowledgement of these adverse ecological influences within the global economic
system. The Shrimp-Turtle decisions, see discussion infra Section 3, are a reflection
of this process within the WTO.
11 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, T 31, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see also United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21:
Earth's Action Plan, 2.1-2.43, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2l/english/Agenda 2l.pdf
[hereinafter Agenda 21].
12 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration urges states to "promote a supportive
and international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sus-
tainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environ-
mental degradation." Rio Declaration, supra note 11, 31. Similarly, Agenda 21
states that the "international community should provide a supportive interna-
tional climate for achieving environment and development goals" by, among
other things, "promoting sustainable development through trade [liberalization]"
and "making trade and environment mutually supportive." Agenda 21, supra note
11, 77 2.3, 2.9.
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tive agreement regarding a global public good, such as climate
change or arms controls, could be hindered by widely shared op-
portunistic drive. That is, countries may prefer to profit from more
stable atmospheric conditions or a more peaceful international
arena but not pay the associated costs- relying instead on the joint
efforts of other countries. This is possible because the benefits as-
sociated with these agreements are not excludable. 13 Second, in an
international system that is still largely anarchic, free-riding cannot
be deterred through hierarchical control. Without a central author-
ity endowed with enforcement powers, it is difficult to achieve and
implement global agreements. Indeed, one of the consequences of
this assumption is that in order to be viable, international agree-
ments must be self-enforcing.
Finally, a further difficulty concerns the asymmetries among
countries with respect to their moral preferences regarding global
dilemmas, and the potential impact of such dilemmas (and associ-
ated policy responses) on their society, economy, and ecosystem.
Consider, for example, the problem of climate change. Countries
may differ in their approach to this dilemma, first, because they
may hold different moral views regarding the rights of future gen-
erations- the primary victims of possible climate change. Second,
opinions may differ also because the adverse impacts of climate
change are not distributed equally. Model-based analyses show
that the most adverse effects of climate change are likely to appear
in developing countries.14 Finally, there could also be disagree-
ments with respect to the policy response. Developing countries
may argue that requiring them to curb CO2 emissions is unjust be-
cause it could hinder their efforts to reduce poverty through indus-
trial development -following the same path which allowed the
developed countries to reach their current wealth.'5 In that sense,
the social costs of radical CO 2 reductions are higher in developing
regions. Such asymmetries make it difficult to reach an agreement
which will be acceptable for all parties.
13 Laurent L. Viguier, A Proposal to Increase Developing Country Participation in
International Climate Policy, 7 ENVTL. SC. & POL'Y 195, 197 (2004); see also Inge Kaul,
Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stem, Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 2, 6-7 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
14 See Viguier, supra note 13, at 195.
15 In other words, the marginal costs of such cutbacks, in terms of national
welfare, will be much higher in the developing regions than in the developed
world (reflecting the different location of these nations in the development lad-
der).
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The linkage literature focuses on three major mechanisms
through which cross-regime linkage may resolve these difficulties
and extend the prospects for global cooperation. First, linkage can
resolve the problem of reaching an international agreement in a
world without a central authority by allowing countries to use the
surplus enforcement power that may be available in one policy
domain to discipline cooperation in other domains.16 Linkage thus
provides a method for aggregating dispersed enforcement power,
allowing for its more efficient allocation to additional policy do-
mains. Second, issue linkage may be used to resolve the problem
of free-riding by linking the negotiations on a regional or global
public good to negotiations on another issue that has the character-
istic of a club good (that is, a good whose benefits are only pro-
vided to club members, and thus cannot be reaped by free-riders).
Paradigmatic examples of international clubs are the European Un-
ion, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), and
the WTO. The intuition behind this proposal is that the incentives
to free-ride on the non-excludable benefits of the global public
good can be offset by the incentives to appropriate the excludable
benefits of the club good.
Finally, issue linkage can resolve the problem of asymmetric
preferences and varied geo-economic conditions, by allowing
countries to link together issues in which they have dissimilar in-
terests. Institutional linkage operates in this context as an indirect
form of side payment. If cooperation on an individual issue bene-
fits country A but hurts B (or is simply not of interest to B), then
linkage allows country A to compensate B by offering cooperation
on a different issue that benefits B. Linkage thus utilizes the
mechanism of economic exchange to bridge between different
worldviews (regarding, for example, the value of natural re-
sources). The use of linkage as a form of side payment when there
are asymmetric benefits across countries is especially important in
the context of the relations between northern and southern coun-
tries.
In the remaining part of this section I want to discuss in further
detail some of the papers that explored these varied mechanisms.
Giancarlo Spagnolo explores the synergic potential of linkage in
16 1 use the idea of surplus enforcement power in two ways. First, it can re-
flect disparities in institutional capacities (e.g., denoting the extra powers of the
WTO dispute settlement system). Second, it can also be used in a game-theoretic
way, reflecting certain properties of linked games. See discussion infra Section 6.
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the context of regimes with asymmetrical enforcement powers.17
He considers a model of two countries, interacting over n policy is-
sues. The interaction over each policy issue takes place within the
strategic structure of an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
with complete information. Countries are assumed to be individ-
ual, rational players.'8 Underlying Spagnolo's model is the view of
the international domain as anarchic space, in which law has no
independent force. This means that international agreements are
meaningful only to the extent that they are self enforcing. That is,
the agreement will be implemented only if there is a possible equi-
librium in which (given the incentive structure pertaining to the
concrete regime) no party has an incentive to withdraw (defect)
unilaterally from the cooperative equilibrium. Another simplify-
ing assumption in Spagnolo's model is that it disregards the trans-
action costs associated with the expansion of the transnational re-
gime through issue linkage. These simplifying assumptions raise
various difficulties, which will be explored in the next section.
Spagnolo argues that under this highly stylized model any rule
which constrains the ability of governments to link several issues
in one agreement (e.g., by punishing the violation of rules-
defection-of one agreement through the introduction of retalia-
tory measures in another regime) is strictly welfare-reducing, since
it constrains the optimal design of international agreements. The
basic logic is the following: issue linkage can facilitate cooperation
by allowing countries to use the surplus or slack enforcement
power that may be available in one policy domain to discipline co-
operation in other domains. Surplus enforcement power is defined
as the expected losses from punishment (in response to defection)
minus the expected gains from one-off defection (free-riding), that
may be available in one domain to discipline cooperation in addi-
tional domains.19 Spagnolo argues that a single "grand interna-
tional agreement" may thus prove superior to any fragmented
structure, because it aggregates available enforcement power, al-
lowing for its more efficient allocation to additional policy do-
mains. This basic intuition holds in cases where policy issues are
separable and countries are assumed either symmetric or asym-
17 Giancarlo Spagnolo, Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Coop-
eration 4-8 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, CEPR Working Paper No. 49.96, 2001),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=163173.
18 Id. at 4-5.
19 Id. at 3.
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metric. 20 In Section 6, I provide a more detailed exposition of
Spagnolo's argument, which I also use to clarify my critique of
some of his assumptions.
The idea of resolving the problem of free-riding by linking ne-
gotiations on a global/regional public good with negotiations on a
club good is explored, for example, by Buchner and others in the
area of climate change. Buchner and others study the U.S. decision
not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (a decision that drastically reduced
the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling greenhouse
gases ("GHG") emissions).21 They analyze a possible linkage be-
tween negotiations on climate change control with decisions con-
cerning international research & development ("R&D") coopera-
tion, and question whether this linkage could induce the United
States to revise its decision and to ratify the Kyoto protocol. They
consider the incentives of six players: the European Union, Japan,
the former Soviet Union, United States, China, and the rest of the
world. In exploring the usefulness of linkage in facilitating coop-
eration on climate change they focus on two main questions: first,
they consider the incentives for the European Union, Japan, and
Russia to adopt a strategy of linkage; second, they consider the in-
centives for the United States to join a coalition which cooperates
both on climate change control and on technological innovation.
The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both di-
mensions (GHG emissions and R&D) is examined from the view-
point of countries' profitability and free-riding incentives.
Their results, which rely on computer simulations, indicate that
issue linkage is unlikely to be effective in inducing the United
States to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Proto-
col. The intuition for this finding is as follows: the benefits from
technological cooperation are much higher for the European Un-
ion, Japan, and above all the former Soviet Union, than for the
United States. The threat of these three countries (the environ-
mental coalition) to exclude the United States from R&D coopera-
tion if it does not comply with the Kyoto agreement is therefore not
credible, because the European Union, Japan, and the former So-
viet Union stand to suffer a bigger loss when the issue linkage
20 That is, when they differ in their objective functions.
21 Barbara Buchner et al., Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage be-
tween R&D and Climate Cooperation (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Re-
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threat is implemented. In addition, the environmental benefits
arising from cooperation on climate change control are smaller
than the technological benefits from R&D cooperation. Therefore
the European Union, Japan, and the former Soviet Union prefer to
lose the environmental benefits than the technological benefits, and
thus accept the United States' free-riding on climate cooperation if
the United States cooperates on R&D.22 Other sorts of linkage-for
example, Kyoto and the WTO--could however yield different re-
sults.
The capacity of issue linkage to facilitate cooperation by allow-
ing countries to tie issues in which they have dissimilar interests is
explored, for example, by Abrego and others in a paper from
2001.23 The starting point for their study is the friction between
developed countries ("DCs") and less-developed countries
("LDCs") in the WTO regarding trade and environment interests.
This friction reflects a presumed variation in the preferences of
northern and southern nations regarding environmental values
(northern nations value the existence of certain ecological assets
more strongly), the fact that these environmental assets are located
mainly in the South, and that these environmental assets are de-
pleted more rapidly when used in trade-related production activi-
ties. Abrego and others argue that linkage expands the bargaining
set and that this could result in a new multi-issue agreement,
which could be embraced by both sides.
24
The basic intuition is that "[linking environmental and trade
negotiations thus gives developing countries opportunities to re-
strain adverse trade policies in DCs, with environmental conces-
sions being available to bargain for lower trade barriers."25 Using
computer simulations they show that joint trade and environment
negotiations are superior to trade-only negotiations because they
allow the North to generate welfare gains from southern environ-
mental management and the South to lower northern trade barri-
ers. Their policy lesson is that LDCs should embrace a trade and
environment negotiation as it provides them with more leverage
over trade. 26
22 Id. at 21-22.
23 See Lisandro Abrego et al., Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes
from Linked Negotiations, 9 REV. INT'L ECON. 414, 416-20 (2001).
24 Id. at 415.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 416. For a similar point made by Spagnolo, see Spagnolo, supra note
20051
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Hilary Sigman offers an empirical analysis of the linkage ques-
tion.27 Her paper examines the question whether bilateral trade
had a positive impact on pollution in rivers that cross international
borders. She finds evidence of lower water pollution in rivers
shared between countries with more extensive trade.28 She con-
cludes that improved coordination from expanded trade may thus
represent a benefit to weigh against the environmental costs of
trade liberalization (e.g., the pollution havens effect). Her paper
does not trace the causal path through which trade promotes envi-
ronmental cooperation. She hypothesizes that trade may promote
cooperation by providing opportunities for implicit side payments
if explicit side payments are politically difficult, and by providing
contractual opportunities for "linking" between environmental and
trade concessions (economic threats support bargaining over envi-
ronmental objectives). Economic integration also allows countries
direct leverage over each other's production, as, for example,
through pollution content tariffs. Finally, intensive trade relation-
ships may instill a perception of shared goals that helps resolve
disputes in other arenas.29
In a series of articles, Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger argued
that the WTO regime could be utilized to prevent a "race to the bot-
tom" in environmental standards.30 Their argument explores the
possible role of the WTO in preventing a race to the bottom in local
environmental standards. While their argument is not structured in
terms of "cross-regime linkage," it is still relevant to our discussion
because national commitments under international treaties usually
have domestic repercussions, such as stricter local emission stan-
dards (the Kyoto Protocol constitutes a paradigmatic example). A
possible race to the bottom could thus have a chilling effect on the
capacity of states to join multilateral environmental treaties or to
17, at 3.
27 Hilary Sigman, Does Trade Promote Environmental Coordination?: Pollution in
International Rivers, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 10-11 (2004).
28 Building on data from the United Nation's Global Environmental Monitor-
ing System ("GEMS") on water quality in international waters.
29 Id. at 2-3.
30 Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of
Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 56 (2002); see also Kyle Bagwell & Robert W.
Staiger, National Sovereignty in the World Trading System: Labor, Environment, and
the WTO, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 2004, at 54, 59 (2001) (describing an adjustment
to WTO rules where governments would be granted more freedom to choose
those policies to deliver their negotiated market-access levels).
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comply with their provisions. Bagwell and Staiger argue that WTO
rules can be used to prevent members from lowering their environ-
mental standards, relative to their level at the time in which the par-
ties negotiated their market-access commitments. The logic of this
argument is that such policy change constitutes a breach of the
original agreement between the parties. It transforms the competi-
tive conditions between the parties by giving an advantage to the lo-
cal industry, both in the local market (against foreign imports) and
in export markets (against foreign producers). They argue that in
terms of GATT and WTO law, such policy change should lead either
to the imposition of countervailing measures (when the manipulat-
ive Member is an exporter) or to a non-violation complaint (when
that Member is an importer).
2. A SECOND LOOK AT THE LINKAGE ARGUMENT
The idea of linkage provides an alternative framework for
thinking about the relationship between international regimes. It
replaces the narrative of conflict, which dominated the "trade and
-" debate with a narrative of synergy and collaboration. The
linkage literature highlights three possible advantages of cross-
regime linkage. First, by allowing countries to use the surplus en-
forcement power that may be available in one policy domain to
discipline cooperation in other domains, linkage can extend the set
of sustainable (or self-enforcing) agreements. 31 Second, linkage can
be instrumental in resolving the problem of free-riding by bridging
the negotiations regarding a global public good dilemma and ne-
gotiations on a club good.32 Finally, by allowing countries to en-
gage in cross-regime bargaining, linkage provides a (welfare-
enhancing) mechanism that can bridge distinct world views and
preferences regarding various global dilemmas.33 There is tenta-
tive and very preliminary empirical support for these arguments,
34
which give support to the claim that the WTO should extend its
involvement in the resolution of transnational environmental di-
31 Spagnolo, supra note 17, at 3.
32 Buchner et al., supra note 21, at 4; see also Carlo Carraro & Domenico Sinis-
calco, International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economy, 42
EUR. ECON. REV. 561, 566 (1998) (describing the linkage between negotiations over
issues with excludable and those with nonexcludable benefits).
33 Abrego, supra note 23, at 416; accord Spagnolo, supra note 17, at 3.
34 Abrego, supra note 23, at 416; accord Sigman, supra note 17, at 10-11.
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lemmas. 35
While the argument for the synergic potential of cross-regime
linkage seems to stand on solid ground, a closer look reveals vari-
ous blind spots, which call into question the prospects of actually
realizing this idea. In this Section, I want to lay bare these blind
spots. I will focus on two main issues: first, the architecture of the
international sphere, and the powers and composition of the insti-
tutions governing it; and second, the way in which the reality of a
pluralistic global society, characterized by clashing cultures and
world-views, may affect the linkage argument. Exploring these
blind spots is a necessary step in the effort to develop feasible link-
age mechanisms.
Consider first the characterization of the transnational domain
as an anarchic space, in which law has no independent force. This
assumption forms the basis for the game-theoretic discussion of in-
ternational environmental cooperation. 36 It leads to the common
economic claim that to be sustainable, international agreements
must be self-enforcing. Further, conceptualizing the transnational
realm as a lawless environment portrays the distinct regimes popu-
lating it as totally symmetric in terms of their fundamental institu-
tional structure and compliance procedures. The differences be-
tween the domains are assumed to arise solely from their distinct
subject matter (e.g., trade, environment, or peace) and the varied
preference configurations of the negotiating states.
This assumption does not provide an accurate portrait of the
contemporary international universe. It disregards the important
role of international institutions and international law in the gov-
ernance of global regimes. International institutions, such as treaty
secretariats and scientific committees, influence the negotiation
and consequent operation of international regimes in various ways
that are not captured by the game theory point of view.37 First, in-
ternational institutions can change parties' preferences by creating
new cognitive frames and generating new knowledge. A good ex-
ample is the work of the scientific communities associated with the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985
35 For this argument, see, for example, PEREZ, supra note 10, at 80-109.
36 See, e.g., Carraro & Siniscalco, supra note 32, at 563; Spagnolo, supra note 17,
at 2.
37 For a general discussion of this "institutionalist" thesis, see Ronald B.
Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Features, Forma-
tion, and Effects, 28 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCEs 429, 451-53 (2003).
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and the Climate Change Convention. 38 Second, treaty secretariats
can influence the negotiation process by means of the power that
they hold over the structure and dynamics of the negotiations (e.g.,
by setting the agenda, creating priorities, providing new frames
through secretariat's reports, and more). Finally, treaty secretariats
play an important role in collecting and disseminating information
about the performance of the treaty signatories. 39 In this way,
treaty secretariats play a critical role in facilitating better compli-
ance with the provisions of the treaty.
A further blind spot of the game theory vision is its failure to
provide a rich account of the role of law in the governance of inter-
national regimes. In some regimes, and the WTO is a prominent
example, law has evolved into an autonomous system, endowed
with independent powers.40 The economic/political models that
conceptualize international treaties through the prism of infinitely
repeated prisoner's dilemmas do not capture the critical role that is
played by the law in such regimes. In these models law has no
meaning: the emergence and continuous operation of the interna-
tional regime is explained as a product of the repeated interaction
between the parties, in view of their exogenously determined pref-
erences, the subject matter of the treaty, and the game's pre-
determined rules. The emergence of an autonomous system of
law, changes, however, the structure of the interaction. The idea of
legal autonomy implies, usually, the existence of a judicial body,
38 See, e.g., PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE CONNECTIONS:
EXPERT NETWORKS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 17, 34 (2002); John
Houghton, Science and International Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 353 (Revesz et al. eds., 2000).
39 Thus, for example, the secretariat of the Climate Change Convention is re-
sponsible for collecting from the signatories National Reports, which include, in
the case of Annex I parties for example, detailed reports of their greenhouse gas
inventories; it is also responsible for operating an open database that will bring
together the various national reports. See U.N. Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Control, National Reports, http://unfccc.int/national-reports/items/
1408.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (detailing the complex reporting require-
ments of this convention).
40 Other leading examples are the International Criminal Court and the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. More details about the structure and
jurisdiction of these two bodies can be found in their highly elaborated websites,
see, respectively, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005) and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
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which provides non-trivial monitoring of players' performance, de-
termines whether the parties have complied with the treaty provi-
sions, and finally decides whether (and in what way) to sanction a
violating party. In all of these decisions the judicial system main-
tains substantive discretion. In contrast, the game-theoretic narra-
tive of self-enforcing contracts assumes that players can perfectly
detect and determine defections (i.e., treaty violations).41 Further,
the sanction is part of the players' predetermined strategy, and is
constructed and executed by them. 42 The WTO system provides a
paradigmatic example for such a juridical setting. In the WTO, the
Panels and Appellate Body have the exclusive authority to deter-
mine whether a certain member has violated the treaty provisions,
to decide whether such violation justifies the initiation of a sanc-
tion, and to determine the magnitude of the sanction.43
A further aspect of legal autonomy is that legal tribunals, and
again I refer primarily to the WTO, may change through their in-
terpretative power the parties' negotiated obligations, that is, the
"rules of the game." 44 This process takes place outside the parties'
41 See Spagnolo, supra note 17, at 6.
42 For example, see discussion of the "grim-trigger" strategy infra Section 6.
See also Ken Binmore, Reciprocity and the Social Contract, 3 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 5, 20
(2004).
43 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
44 Prominent examples in the case of the WTO are the Appellate Body deci-
sions in the Shrimp case, which recognized the power of a WTO member to use
trade measures in order to promote the establishment of an international envi-
ronmental treaty, in contrast to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") precedent. Another example includes the decision of the Appellate
Body in the Asbestos case (and several others) to allow non-members, such as non-
governmental organizations, to submit briefs to the Court, even though such pro-
cedure is not recognized anywhere in the WTO Agreement. For the details of
these decisions, see Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); Appellate Body Report,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter First Shrimp Report]); Panel Report,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001); Appellate Body
Report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products -
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Second Shrimp Report]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities -
Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 50-
57, WT/DS135 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos]. It should be noted that
my interpretation of these cases is incompatible with article 3(2) of the Dispute
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control (although of course there is strategic interaction between
the judiciary and the parties -especially through the political bod-
ies of the regime- but this interaction is very difficult to capture in
a formal model). In the world of the game theory models dis-
cussed above, such change in the rules of the game can only hap-
pen through the intervention of the modeler. The contours and
scope of law as an autonomous social force within a certain regime
cannot be determined a priori; this requires a contextual inquiry.
But it is a mistake to disregard the independent role of law in
structuring expectations and behavior in the transnational domain.
A further problematic feature of the game theory models con-
cerns the way in which they aggregate the parties' costs and bene-
fits across the linked regimes. The technique that is utilized in
these models depends on the existence of a common monetary (or
other) scale, to which the varied costs and benefits could be trans-
lated. In the context of the trade and environment conflict, this as-
sumption requires one to accept the idea that nature and environ-
mental damage can be attributed with monetary values. The claim
that linkage could facilitate bargains between trade concessions
and environmental commitments is based on the assumption that
the value of these exchanged "goods" can be calculated and com-
pared using a common scale. This assumption is, however, highly
problematic.45 First, the anthropocentric worldview underlying the
assumption of common denomination is at odds with the vision-
shared by several schools of environmental thought-that nature
has an intrinsic and nonderivative value.46 While linkage may suc-
ceed in giving nature a voice in the trade arena, this voice is fil-
tered by uncommitted economic calculations. The alternative phi-
losophical standpoint, which postulates nature as an equal member
of the global, moral, and political community, is thus left unchal-
lenged. But the idea of linkage is also problematic from a mercan-
Settlement Understanding which states that the rulings of the WTO tribunals
"cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements." There is a wide gap between this provision and the actual legal dy-
namics of the WTO.
45 However, there has been significant progress on the question of how to
value nature and how to translate environmental damage into monetary terms.
See, e.g., Stephen C. Farber et al., Economic and Ecological Concepts for Valuing Eco-
system Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 375, 377 (2002).
46 The anthropocentric bias is reflected in the valuation techniques used by
environmental economists, which commonly measure environmental goods by
evaluating their monetary value to humans.
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tilist perspective because the kind of exchange it calls for -between
tangible trade concessions and ecological commitments whose
economic value is uncertain and even speculative -is seen as artifi-
cial and problematic.
A further blind spot of the game theory models concerns their
assumptions regarding national preferences with respect to envi-
ronmental matters.47 The economic case for linkage was based,
among other things, on the idea that cross-regime linkage could
create new opportunities for welfare enhancing deals by exploiting
asymmetries in national preferences regarding, for example, envi-
ronment and economic development. This presupposition disre-
gards the wide gap between what people say about the environ-
ment and what they are willing to do about it in terms of their
economic and political choices. This gap can be found, for exam-
ple, in the social attitude toward ecological problems whose impact
is projected to happen in the future (e.g., climate change), and gen-
erally in the context of ecological problems whose social impact is
uncertain (e.g., loss of biodiversity). 48
The foregoing critique requires us to change the way we think
about cross-regime linkage. First, any attempt to promote linkage
schemes must identify and deal with the discursive or ideological
differences that permeate the targeted regimes. These differences
may bar potential cross-regime deals by preventing an agreement
on how to aggregate costs and benefits across the linked domains.
For example, the idea that northern and southern nations may ex-
change trade concessions for environmental conmmitments depends
on the ability of these nations to reach a consensus on an algorithm
that could be used to aggregate environmental costs and trade
benefits. This is not an easy task. Indeed, when one examines the
negotiating history of the GATT/WTO, one sees little evidence of a
true and effective willingness of the northern countries to engage
in trade-environment bargains. 49
Second, accepting the idea that institutions matter means that
one has to consider more seriously the implications of different in-
stitutional structures and cultures to the linkage project. One im-
plication has to do with the meaning of "power." Whereas the
47 Abrego et al., supra note 23, at 418.
48 See, e.g., Buchner et al., supra note 21, at 6-10 (discussing the U.S. decision
not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol).
49 For a more detailed exposition of this point, see PEREZ, supra note 10, at 86-
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game-theory narrative postulates this idea simply in terms of
asymmetries in the long-term benefits associated with different re-
gimes (considered against possible gains from one-off deviation),
the institutionalist view requires us to consider, also, asymmetries
in the powers and maturity of the organizations associated with
distinct policy domains. These may reflect the fact that one regime
has developed an independent judicial system and a highly influ-
ential community of bureaucrats that support its operation. In-
deed, the WTO is seen as more powerful than parallel global envi-
ronmental regimes particularly because of the independent powers
of its judicial system and the efficient backing it receives from a
powerful trade community.
A second issue that is brought to fore by the institutionalist
perspective is the recognition that linking separate regimes could
generate various transaction costs. Most of the economic discus-
sions of linkage tend to disregard this question. This modeling
choice does not seem justified, however. A more realistic assump-
tion is that these costs not only exist, but increase with the number
of linked issues. These costs may reflect various aspects of the
process of linkage. A first type of cost reflects the difficulties of
administering an enhanced regime. This may reflect the increasing
complexity of simultaneously negotiating multiple issues (e.g.,
evaluating, in a single point in time, the total costs and benefits of
all linked issues), the implementation phase (e.g., monitoring be-
havior across multiple domains), and the possible erosion in the
functional efficacy of existing institutions. In Section 6, I give a for-
mal illustration of the idea of transaction costs, building on the
model of Spagnolo.
A second type of transaction cost reflects the organizational
barriers associated with clashing institutional cultures. Different
international regimes can develop idiosyncratic cultural disposi-
tions and biases, which may remain hidden if these regimes are ob-
served just in terms of the collective benefits they produce, meas-
ured in sterile monetary terms. In weighing distinct regimes such
as the GATT/WTO and the Climate Change Convention, one has
to consider, therefore, not just the economic value of their underly-
ing "goods" (free trade and a stable climate), but also the conflict-
ing cultural dispositions associated with them, which could act as
barriers to potential welfare enhancing linkages.
The tendency in the economic literature to disregard the intri-
cate details of the organizational and cultural attributes of the
transnational environment is therefore highly problematic. The
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following section explores how the question of linkage is dealt
with under the law of the WTO.
3. PROSPECTS FOR CROSS-REGIME LINKAGE UNDER CONTEMPORARY
TRADE LAW
3.1. The Institutional Culture of the WTO and the Ground-breaking
Decisions of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp Case
Exploring the question of linkage in the context of the WTO re-
quires an understanding of the institutional idiosyncrasies of this
organization -its ethos and cultural orientation. This could expose
the possible barriers and adverse effects of linking the WTO with
other domains. The GATT,50 which the WTO replaced in 1995, was
strongly influenced by a mercantilist ethos. The mercantilist ethos
was a product of two ideals: fairness and nationalism. The wran-
gling over tariff levels and other trade concessions within GATT
negotiating rounds was not guided by the maxims of welfare or ef-
ficiency. Rather, it was driven by a common obsession with "mar-
ket access." Tariff reductions were agreed upon only if they with-
stood the test of balanced reciprocity: any forgone custom income
was to be compensated for by comparable payoffs in terms of in-
creased access to foreign markets.51
This mercantilist culture was unreceptive to environmental
concerns. The parties to the "mercantilist game" were seeking
market access, not ecological benefits.52 The practitioners of mer-
cantilism were blind to the ecological implications of this game:
both to the possibility that trade expansion could lead to ecological
degradation, and to the idea that linking between the negotiations
50 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
51 The mercantilist spirit of the GATT was captured nicely by Paul Krugman:
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations
eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that
they are a game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an in-
crease in exports -no matter how expensive to produce in terms of other
opportunities foregone [sic] - is a victory, and an increase in imports - no
matter how many resources it releases for other uses- is a defeat.
Paul Krugman, Mhat Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 113, 114 (1997).
52 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty
and International Economic Institutions, 116 Q.J. ECON. 519, 522 (2001).
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within the GATT and negotiations in other international forums
could provide greater flexibility in resolving global environmental
dilemmas. The persistence of the mercantilist game, and the closed
community of trade bureaucrats and corporate lobbyists who par-
ticipated in it, produced a deep sense of purposefulness within the
GATT. The mercantilist vision of facilitating transnational trade
through balanced - rather than welfare-maximizing - liberalization
of national markets was seen as the overarching mission of the or-
ganization.5
3
The Appellate Body, in its landmark decisions in the Shrimp
dispute,54 has moved away from the mercantilist ethos, which has
dominated the GATT era, offering a broader interpretation of the
goals of the WTO. The Appellate Body has reconstructed the nor-
mative hierarchy of the WTO by creating parity between the envi-
ronmental exceptions included in Article XX of the GATT and the
substantive obligations of the GATT (e.g., Articles I and III).55
These decisions of the Appellate Body reflect a clear exercise of ju-
dicial autonomy, signaling a stronger willingness to experiment
with cross-regime linkages. However, this willingness remains
bounded by the heritage of the GATT and is still a far cry from the
highly developed structures envisioned in the theoretical literature
discussed above.
The Shrimp dispute was triggered by an import ban that was in-
troduced by U.S. authorities on the importation of shrimp that
were harvested in a way that endangered the lives of sea turtles.
The U.S. regulations required exporting countries to adopt, as a
condition for obtaining export certificate, a conservatory program
including a requirement to use ecologically friendly fishing tech-
nology - i.e., Turtle-Excluder Devices - supported by a credible en-
forcement system.56 The Appellate Body concluded that the U.S.
import ban on shrimp was not consistent with Article XI of GATT,
because it was a quantitative restriction on trade, and could not be
53 See, further on that point PEREZ, supra note 10, at 51-54 (discussing the
mercantilist ethos of the GATT and the environment).
54 Second Shrimp Report, supra note 44.
55 See also Appellate Body Report, United States -Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, at 17-18, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter
Reformulated Gasoline].
56 Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61
Fed. Reg. 17,342, 17,344 (Apr. 19, 1996). In order to simplify the presentation,
some of the details of the U.S. program were omitted.
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justified under Article XX. 57 The second Shrimp ruling was trig-
gered by an article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU") complaint by Malaysia accusing the United States of fail-
ing to properly implement the recommendations of the Appellate
Body.58 The complaint challenged the measures that were taken by
the U.S. to implement the Appellate Body decision, focusing in
particular on the Revised Guidelines, which were issued by the
United States in July 1999.59 The Appellate Body rejected the Ma-
laysian complaint and upheld the Panel's finding that the United
States' revised regulatory framework was being applied in a man-
ner that met the requirements of Article XX.60
The Appellate Body's first ruling sets out a new interpretative
framework for reading the text of the GATT. The Appellate Body
rejected the Panel's attempt to reintroduce to the WTO legal sys-
tem, through the interpretation of the introductory section of Arti-
cle XX - the chapeau - a pro-trade preference (in the spirit of the
Tuna-Dolphin decisions).61 The Panel ruled that measures (such as
unilateral trade embargos) which undermine the WTO multilateral
trading system must be regarded as not within the scope of meas-
ures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX,62 a formulation
similar to the one used by the Tuna Panels.63 The Appellate Body
disagreed. It noted that the interpretation of the chapeau should not
be governed by the narrow goal of maintaining the multilateral
trading system.64 The chapeau reflects the necessity to strike a bal-
57 First Shrimp Report, supra note 44, at 7 187-88.
58 Under article 21.5 a panel is called to review the measures taken to imple-
ment the Panel's or Appellate Body's rulings. Second Shrimp Report, supra note 44,
7 1-2.
59 Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law
101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Opera-
tions, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,949 (uly 8, 1999).
60 Second Shrimp Report, supra note 44, 7 153-54. For a more detailed analy-
sis of the Shrimp saga, see PEREZ, supra note 10, at 70-94.
61 The references that follow, unless explicitly noted, are to the first decision
of the Appellate Body.
62 Second Shrimp Report, supra note 44, 48 ("[T]he approach taken by the
Panel [is] that Members are not allowed to resort to measures that would under-
mine the multilateral trading system and thus abuse the exceptions contained in
Article XX.").
63 See Panel Report, United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 5.27,
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna f]; Panel Report, United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 5.26, 32 I.L.M 842, 894 [hereinafter Tuna II]; First
Shrimp Report, supra note 44.
64 First Shrimp Report, supra note 44, T 116, 155-56.
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ance between the rights embodied in the various exceptions of Ar-
ticle XX and the primary obligations of the GATT (e.g., Articles I
and III).65 This balancing exercise should be guided by the recogni-
tion that the rights that are embodied in the environmental excep-
tions of Article XX and the primary obligations of the GATT (e.g.,
Articles I and III) are of the same order.66 The main goal of the cha-
peau, the Appellate Body stated, is to prevent abuse of the excep-
tions of Article XX67; it is, in fact, "one expression of the principle of
good faith."68 The Appellate Body emphasized in this context that a
failure to comply with one of the general obligations of the GATT
cannot, in itself, prevent a Member from invoking Article XX suc-
cessfully. Such interpretation would deprive Article XX of any
practical meaning, denying its independent and primary norma-
tive value.69
The Appellate Body's- general ruling was embedded in a new
framework for interpreting Article XX, based on a two-tiered
model.70 According to this model, to be accorded the protection of
Article XX, a measure must not only come under one of the particu-
lar exceptions listed in Article XX, it must also satisfy the require-
ments imposed by the opening clause of Article XX-the chapeau.71
65 Id. 156, 159.
66 It might be useful to quote the exact words of the Appellate Body on this
point:
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially
the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium be-
tween the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX
and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provi-
sions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing
rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair
the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members them-
selves in that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as ex-
pressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as
the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts
making up specific cases differ.
Id. 159.
67 See id. 150.
68 Id. 158 (emphasis added).
69 See id. 151 (" [T]he exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of
legal right.").
70 First Shrimp Report, supra note 44, 118.
71 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 55, at 22.
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3.2. The Implications of the Shrimp Decision for Extending the Linkage
Between the WTO and the Environmental Realm
The Appellate Body's innovative reading of Article XX reflects
a deep recognition of the linkage between the trade and environ-
mental domains, and a willingness to give this linkage a legal ef-
fect. In the second Shrimp ruling, the Appellate Body accepted as
legitimate the imposition of an effective embargo by the United
States against certain shrimp producing countries (mainly from
East Asia), as a means to pressure these countries to join a multilat-
eral effort to promote the conservation of sea turtles. By that, the
Appellate Body has recognized the decisive role that trade meas-
ures can play in securing participation in, and compliance with,
multilateral environmental agreements, acknowledging that the
conclusion of multilateral environmental agreements may be
thwarted by "free-riding," and that the threat of trade sanctions
may be necessary in order to deter such behavior.
The Appellate Body laid down several conditions, which must
be satisfied by a trade measure, if it is to receive the protection of
Article XX (which I call the "good-faith protocol" of Article XX).
The conditions consist of the following obligations: a requirement
to explore the possibility of solving the environmental problem
through a multilateral agreement rather than unilaterally; applica-
tion of the measure in question in a transparent, flexible, and even-
handed manner (a "due process" requirement); a requirement to
provide technological assistance on a nondiscriminatory basis; and
finally, an obligation to consider the incremental costs that the envi-
ronmental program may generate, both for the domestic manufac-
turers and for the foreign exporters as a result of the measure.
72
This broader reading of the goals of the WTO seems to signal,
then, a greater institutional willingness to experiment with cross-
regime linking. In the following sections I would like to consider
the various repercussions and possible extensions of the Shrimp
rulings.
It is important to point out, at the start, the differences between
the Shrimp ruling and the economic-inspired models of linkage, dis-
cussed above. The Appellate Body's decision does not provide a di-
72 The first three requirements are based on the decisions of the Appellate
Body in the Shrimp case. The latter obligation is based on the Appellate Body de-
cision in Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 55, at 28. See also PEREZ, supra note 10,
at 82, for a more detailed explanation of this argument.
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rect authority for wide-ranging experimentation in linkage schemes.
It is much more modest in what it authorizes: it merely allows one
country to suspend some of the trade concessions that it has previ-
ously negotiated with another country. Despite the narrow scope of
the Appellate Body's decision, the rationale of its decision can be
used to justify broader actions, which are closer in their structure to
those envisioned in the theoretical literature.
To identify these possible extensions we need to understand the
ratio decidendi of the Shrimp case. The Shrimp case dealt with a rela-
tively narrow environmental dilemma-the conservation of an en-
dangered migratory species,7 3 and focused on the difficulties of forg-
ing a new Multilateral Environmental Agreement ("MEA"). It was
triggered by a unilateral trade measure, which was initiated by the
United States without a formal legal backing from an international
legal authority (e.g., from an MEA).74
There are various directions in which this decision may be ex-
tended. One possible direction questions the applicability of the
Shrimp ruling to cases involving pure global public goods, such as
problems relating to the atmosphere. This extension seems to follow
naturally from the case reasoning, and does not seem to raise diffi-
cult questions.75 A second possible direction concerns extending the
Shrimp ruling to a group of countries acting together. Such exten-
sion seems consistent with the logic of the decision (as long as these
countries satisfy, collectively, the "good-faith" protocol depicted
above). This possible extension may be very important in real life,
because given the current asymmetries that characterize the global
society, pressuring big players such as the United States or the
European Union to collaborate on some environmental cause can
only happen, if at all, through the concerted action of several coun-
tries.
A further question involves the extension of the Shrimp ruling
from the negotiation phase (which characterized the Shrimp case) to
the post-contractual phase. While the free-riding problem is most
visible at the pre-contractual phase, similar difficulties can arise after
73 See First Shrimp Report, supra note 44, 133.
74 E.g., Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Ani-
mals art. 3, June 23, 1979, 1651 U.N.T.S 361, 19 I.L.M. 15.
75 One possible difficulty may arise in the case of global public goods, which
are located in the territory of one nation such as tropical forests. This scenario in-
volves a deeper tension between the collective interests of the global community
and the sovereignty of the nation state hosting the global public good.
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the conclusion of a MEA, both with respect to non-signatories that
free-ride on the efforts of contributing parties, and with respect to
members that fail to comply with the provisions of the MEA. This
scenario raises the question of the legality of a trade measure that
was initiated after the conclusion of a MEA in order to enforce non-
signatories to join the agreement, or in order to force a non-
complying party to fulfill his commitments. Such measures may be
authorized by the MEA or reflect a private initiative. 76 Whether
such measures can be justified under the Shrimp ruling may be open
to debate. On the one hand, if it is legitimate to use a unilateral
trade measure in order to secure participation in a multilateral ef-
fort to resolve a global ecological problem, (the Shrimp case) it is
hard to see why it should not be legitimate to invoke this tool in
order to secure participation in, or compliance with, the provisions
of an existing agreement. On the other hand, one can argue that
once an agreement has entered into force, its parties should abide
by its provisions, including those governing the issues of compli-
ance and dispute resolution. Thus, if the trade measures under
dispute were not authorized by the MEA, they can be interpreted
as an act of "bad faith," denying the acting state(s) from the protec-
tion of Article XX. 77
WTO law offers two further routes through which trade and en-
vironmental commitments may be linked: the doctrines of counter-
vailing measures and non-violation complaint. As noted in Section
1.2, Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger argue that a country lowering
its domestic environmental standards relative to their level at the
time in which the parties negotiated their market-access commit-
ments is breaching its WTO commitments. This is because in this act
the country transforms the market conditions, by giving a competi-
tive advantage to its domestic industry, both in the local market
(against foreign imports) and in export markets (against foreign
producers).78 One can try to extend their argument also to cases in
which a WTO signatory refuses to join a costly MEA. 79 To the extent
76 States may use a variety of trade measures to pressure their trading part-
ners. These include, in addition to trade embargos, eco-tariffs, countervailing
measures, or green subsidies.
77 Under this view there is no conflict between the rules of the WTO and
trade measures used and authorized by certain MEAs, such as the Basel Conven-
tion and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES").
78 Bagwell, Mavroidis & Staiger, supra note 30, at 61.
79 Such argument seems difficult, though, because the environmental require-
ments of a new MEA (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) would not have been in force when
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that such refusal may be judged illegitimate by WTO law -it could
lead either to the imposition of countervailing measures (when the
manipulative state is an exporter) or to a non-violation complaint
(when that state is an importer). I doubt, however, that these possi-
ble reactions can be justified under the current countervailing and
non-violation rules of the WTO. A state invoking such measures
would thus have to invoke Article XX, bringing us back to the
Shrimp ruling and its conditions.
Overall the Shrimp ruling seems to open the door for a partial
usage of trade measures in order to facilitate cooperation in the en-
vironmental realm. Note that the foregoing scenarios, even though
they extend the "linkage repertoire" of the WTO, are still relatively
modest, in that they realize the idea of linkage indirectly through
pro-linkage interpretation of Article XX. Under current WTO law
it is therefore the parties, rather than the organization as a whole,
who take the lead in realizing the linkage vision. Currently, what
the WTO provides (at most) is a receptive ground for such state-
triggered experimentation.
3.3. Other Forms of Trade-Environment Linkage within the WTO:
The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP")
The Shrimp ruling has opened new routes for using the en-
forcement capacities of the WTO in the environmental domain, al-
though some of the routes outlined above reflect a speculative
reading of current WTO law. In this section, I would like to focus
on another mechanism of cross-regime linkage, which is available
under current WTO law: GSP conditionality. GSP conditionality
creates an explicit linkage between trade concessions and envi-
ronmental commitments. The Generalized System of Preferences
provides preferential market access to developing countries; it re-
flects the non-homogenous efforts of various developed countries
to provide developing countries with preferential tariffs and other
privileges, in response to Article XXXVI, paragraph 3 of the GATT
of 1947.80 Some of these schemes, such as the EU GSP scheme, re-
the parties first negotiated their market-access commitments. It should be empha-
sized, though, that a race to the bottom in, for example, local air pollution stan-
dards, is also likely to deter international negotiations regarding global climate
issues.
80 Article XXXVI, paragraph 3 of GATT states that "[t]here is need for posi-
tive efforts designed to ensure that less-developed contracting parties secure a
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." For a general discussion of the implementation of spe-
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quire the beneficiary countries to meet certain environmental re-
quirements as a condition for receiving the preferential treatment.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the whole universe
of GSP schemes, so I will concentrate on the two biggest players,
the European Union and the United States.
The current EU GSP Scheme offers five different arrangements
for beneficiary countries. Among the five options is a special in-
centive arrangement that is available on request to countries im-
plementing certain standards for the sustainable management of
tropical forests. The special environmental arrangement provides
eligible countries with an additional tariff reduction. 81 The current
GSP scheme is due to be replaced by a revised scheme starting
from the beginning of 2006. The revised scheme will include more
comprehensive environmental requirements, which will be part of
a new scheme called "GSP Plus." Countries wishing to benefit
from this scheme will be required to ratify and effectively imple-
ment twenty-seven core conventions dealing with human and la-
bor rights, good governance, and the protection of the environment
(by December 31, 2008).82
The United States operates four systems of preferential trade
for developing countries: the Generalized System of Preferences,
the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Andean Trade Pref-
cial and differential treatment provisions of the WTO agreements, see Note by Se-
cretariat, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/77 (Oct. 25, 2000).
81 For further details on the EU Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP")
scheme, see User's Guide to the European Union's Scheme of Generalised Tariff Prefer-
ences, Feb. 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/
gspguide.htm. The EU scheme also offers additional incentives for countries that
accept certain standards pertaining to the protection of labor rights.
82 The key environmental treaties mentioned in the proposal are: Montreal
Protocol, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Stockholm Convention on persistent Organic
Pollutants, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Convention
on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and Kyoto Protocol to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Commission of the
European Communities, Developing Countries, International Trade and Sustainable
Development: The Function of the Community's Generalised System of Preferences
("GSP") for the Ten-Year Period from 2006 to 2015, at 6, COM (2004) 461 final (July 7,
2004) (highlighting the objectives of the new GSP scheme); GSP: The New EU Pref-
erential Market Access System for Developing Countries, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/memo230605-en.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2005)
(noting that the new GSP plus "will cover around 7200 products which can enter
the EU duty free [as long as the beneficiaries] meet a number of criteria").
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erence Act, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 83 In contrast to
those of the European Union, the U.S. preferential schemes do not
have an explicit environmental component; they focus on the bene-
ficiary countries practices relating to trade, investment, intellectual
property, and the protection of human rights and worker rights.
8 4
Thus, for example, the African Growth and Opportunity Act
("AGOA") authorizes the President to designate countries as eligi-
ble to receive the benefits of AGOA if they are determined to have
established, or are making continual progress toward establishing
the following: a market-based economy that protects private prop-
erty rights; a viable legal system based on the principle of equality;
a pluralistic political system; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade
and investment; protection of intellectual property rights; policies
to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educa-
tional opportunities; and protection of internationally recognized
worker rights. 85 Further conditions include a requirement not to
engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security or for-
eign policy interests, 86 and a requirement not to engage in gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights or to provide
support for acts of international terrorism. 87
It is an open question whether the GSP schemes operated by
developed countries actually contribute to the welfare of develop-
ing countries. A recent study of the GSP schemes of the United
States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada, which was con-
83 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Preference Programs,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeDevelopment/Preference-Programs/SectionIndex
.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (providing an overview of the U.S. schemes).
84 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Jan. 30, 2004,
Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible Improvements
8-11, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 Gan. 30, 2004), http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsb20038_.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
In contrast, many of the recent free trade agreements negotiated by the United
States (e.g., those with Jordan, Australia, and Singapore) do include extensive en-
vironmental provisions. See generally Office of the United States Trade Represen-
tative, Trade Agreements Home, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Section
_Index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
85 See Trade and Development Act of 2000, § 104, 19 U.S.C. § 3703 (2000)
(mentioning the following internationally recognized worker rights: "the right of
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use
of any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of
children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health").
86 Id. § 3703(a)(2).
87 Id. § 3703(a)(3).
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ducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment ("UNCTAD"), offers a solemn picture of the efficacy of the
WTO GSP program. It points out that the utilization and benefits
of these trade preferences are concentrated in few country/ product
pairs and that their general impact has been inconsequential.88 If
this is indeed the case, it seems reasonable to assume that the influ-
ence of the environmental conditions imposed by these schemes
has also been negligible.89 Whether such conditions are compatible
with the rules of the WTO is still an open question despite the re-
cent ruling of the Appellate Body in European Communities -
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Coun-
tries90 and is likely to generate further debate within the WTO.91
88 See UNCTAD Report, supra note 84, at x; see also Bernard Hoekman et al.,
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the W/TO: Moving For-
ward After Cancun, 27 WORLD ECON. 481, 503 (2004) ("[Pjreferences are not a long-
term solution ... they come at a high cost to excluded countries and may not
benefit recipients much either.").
89 An additional question in this context is to what extent GSP conditionality
serves the interests of the beneficiary countries or the global community (e.g., en-
vironmental and human rights values) or rather those of the granting state. This
is particularly true in the case of the U.S. schemes, which include conditions per-
taining to the protection of foreign investors and intellectual property rights.
90 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
91 The Appellate Body did not consider directly the environmental and labor
conditions of the EU scheme, because India has dropped its claims on these issues,
focusing only on the EU Drug Enforcement provisions. However, some of the
Appellate Body comments have a more general application. The Appellate Body
first stated that, "[in granting ... differential tariff treatment . . . preference-
granting countries are required... to ensure that identical treatment is available
to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries." Id. 173. Second, the "response of a
preference-granting country must be taken with a view to improving the devel-
opment, financial, or trade situation of a beneficiary country, based on the particu-
lar need at issue." Id. 164. The second prong of the Appellate Body ruling
seems to raise doubts as to the WTO compatibility of some of the conditions in-
cluded in the EU and U.S. schemes. Some of these conditions cannot be easily jus-
tified on the basis of the "development, financial or trade situation" of the benefi-
ciary countries and may more accurately reflect the interests of the granting
country (e.g., the trade/investment provisions of the U.S. schemes) or the global
community (the requirement to ratify core environmental treaties in the new EU
GSP scheme). For a more detailed discussion of the implications of this ruling, see
Steve Charnovitz et al., Internet Roundtable: The Appellate Body's GSP Decision, 3
WORLD TRADE REV. 239, 239-65 (2004).
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4. REALIZING THE LINKAGE VISION: THE INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE WITHIN THE VVTO
4.1. The Challenge
Linking trade and environmental regimes can have positive
synergic effects. However, as explained in Section 1, it is difficult
to implement the idea of linkage in a society that is divided in its
stance toward nature and is governed by real and "messy" institu-
tions rather than sterile infinitely repeated games. First, imple-
menting linkage schemes requires the development of a common
metrics that would facilitate the balancing of costs and benefits
across the distinct domains (e.g., trade and environment). Second,
implementing a linkage project requires policymakers to deal with
the institutional barriers and transaction costs that are likely to ac-
company this process. These dual challenges are not unique to the
trade and environment context; they are likely to be present in
other policy contexts such as trade and labor rights.
These difficulties could hinder further experimentation with
the idea of linkage in the WTO. To understand this problem, con-
sider again how linkage is realized within the contemporary uni-
verse of WTO law. The principal forms of linkage that are recog-
nized by WTO law are: Article XX enforcement actions (following
the Shrimp ruling), incentive measures (under the GSP), and very
restricted institutional cooperation (e.g., limited observer status to
certain MEAs). Let us focus, for example, on the idea of using Ar-
ticle XX to authorize enforcement action. In deliberating the con-
sistency of such measures with Article XX, WTO tribunals are
likely to face serious difficulties, which were not given sufficient
attention in the Shrimp-Turtle rulings. The WTO tribunals would
be required to apply the good-faith protocol, which was developed
by the Appellate Body as a guide for interpreting the chapeau, in
order to decide the legality of trade-based enforcement action.
This protocol requires a state, before introducing a unilateral trade
measure, to explore the possibility of responding to the environ-
mental risk in question through international agreement.
The law of the WTO does not contain, however, evaluative cri-
teria that could allow its tribunals to determine whether the mem-
ber using a trade measure has made a good-faith effort to negotiate
an MEA with the countries targeted by the trade measure. The ul-
timate failure of such negotiations may be the result of conflicting
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moral preferences with respect to the value of the ecological asset
that was the subject of the dispute.92 In some cases this ideological
dispute may be (legally) resolved by looking into the existing body
of international environmental law. For example, in the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute, the thesis that sea turtles are worth preserving was
supported by their classification as endangered species in the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora.93 But this move can only provide a partial solu-
tion because international environmental law is predominately
treaty-based, and the membership in MEAs is far from universal.
And of course, some negotiations may focus on issues that are not
covered by existing agreements. 94 The negotiations may also fail
because the parties may have different views with respect to the
economic value of the ecological asset, preventing the conclusion
of eco-financial barters. To give a concrete example, imagine that
Malaysia would have agreed to join a multilateral effort to protect
sea turtles, but would have demanded financial compensation to
help fund the environmental technology needed to protect sea tur-
tles. This demand could reflect the disparate moral-environmental
preferences of the two countries, as well as variance in their na-
tional wealth. Suppose, next, that Malaysia rejects a certain pack-
age proposed by the United States. What criteria should a WTO
panel use to evaluate the fairness of this proposed deal?
These cultural and ideological cleavages are not the only diffi-
culties that the linkage project may face. More extensive experi-
mentation with linkage is also likely to generate substantial trans-
action costs. In the case of the WTO, these costs represent the need
to extend the decisionmaking capacities of the legal and adminis-
trative branches, so as to enable them to cope with the increasing
cognitive, decisional, and political burdens that are likely to be im-
posed on them by the linkage process. 95 These increasing burdens
92 And thus not a result of the bad faith of either party.
93 See First Shrimp Ruling, supra note 44, 132 ("The exhaustibility of sea tur-
tles would in fact have been very difficult to controvert since all of the seven rec-
ognized species of sea turtles are today listed in Appendix 1 of [CITES]").
94 For example, in the Shrimp case, both the United States and some of the
complainants (Malaysia and Thailand) were not parties to the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. See First Shrimp Ruling, supra
note 43, 130 n.113 ("We note that India and Pakistan have ratified the Conven-
tion on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, but that Malaysia,
Thailand and the United States are not parties to the Convention.").
95 It is quite clear, for example, that the WTO current legal establishment does
not have the expertise that is needed to administer a complex environmental re-
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could severely erode the operational efficacy of these branches,
eroding the functional effectiveness of the WTO and linked regime.
A further potential barrier concerns the conflicting institutional
cultures that may characterize the trade and environment context.
For example, the enduring influence of the mercantilist tradition
within the WTO community of trade bureaucrats could form a bar-
rier to potential linkage schemes.
4.2. Building Feasible Trade-Environment Linkage Mechanisms
Building feasible linkage mechanisms at the trade-environment
front depends therefore on finding plausible answers to two di-
lemmas: first, the deep discursive and ideological discords that
permeate the trade-environment nexus; and second, the organiza-
tional discords that are likely to accompany any attempt to inte-
grate highly different organizations. The challenge of the linkage
project is to find institutional mechanisms that may deal with these
dilemmas.
In approaching this challenge, it is important to recognize that
the ideological cleavages underlying the trade-environment con-
flict may be unbridgeable. Modem society does not have at its
disposal some meta-discourse that could -superseding economics
or environmental philosophy -offer a precise and universally ac-
ceptable algorithm for balancing between trade and environmental
objectives (which could, subsequently, be incorporated into the
rule-book of the WTO or UNEP). Similarly, this task cannot be
handed over to a single institution, whether UNEP or the WTO. It
is unrealistic, for example, to expect the Appellate Body to lead this
project independently through a creative reading of Article XX.
Such a move could generate intense opposition, both because of its
incompatibility with the mercantilist culture that still dominates
the WTO, and because it is likely to be interpreted as an illegiti-
mate intrusion into state sovereignty. At this point, it might make
more sense, therefore, to adopt a second-best tactic, which would
take the linkage project as a gradual process that must be imple-
mented in stages (maybe never reaching full scale integration).
Rather than implementing such project in one stroke, which in the
WTO context would require the introduction of radical changes to
gime such as the Kyoto Protocol. Think, for example, of the complexity of deter-
mining a breach of the Kyoto emissions obligations, given the multiple options
through which parties can offset their emissions, using carbon sinks, joint projects,
and emissions trading.
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the rules governing the dispute resolution process 96 and to the
provisions of Article XX, the focus should lie on creating institu-
tional conditions, which could facilitate the development of feasi-
ble linkage projects.
Reforming the institutional setting in which the trade-
environment dilemma is deliberated should form the starting point
of this gradual process. Such reform should focus on two key is-
sues: first, building a richer understanding of the environmental
risks facing humanity, and second, the causal relations between
trade liberalization and ecological degradation.97 Developing such
an understanding is a necessary step in any attempt to evaluate
trade and environmental policies. To this end the international
community will have to invest more resources in developing
mechanisms that can evaluate and monitor the ecological impacts
of trade policies. These mechanisms should provide both ex ante
assessment of trade negotiations (in the style of environmental im-
pact assessment in the planning context) and ex post monitoring of
working regimes. There are already some examples of such
mechanisms.98
96 See generally Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 43.
97 See Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth, and the Environ-
ment, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 35 (2004) (noting the scarcity of pollution data, par-
ticularly with respect to the economic and ecological conditions in less-developed
countries).
98 Both the United States and the European Union engage in environmental
review of trade agreements. In the United States, the United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR"), following Executive Order 13,141 of 1999 regarding the Envi-
ronmental Review of Trade Agreements, published several environmental re-
views of bilateral trade agreements. See Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg.
63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999) (establishing a policy of assessing the environmental impact
of United States trade agreements); Office of the USTR, Bilateral Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Section-Index.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 3, 2005) (listing bilateral trade agreements between the U.S. and various
countries). The European Commission developed a methodology for Sustainabil-
ity Impact Assessment ("SIA") that was applied to the Doha Agenda and to the
EU negotiations with Mercusor/Chile. See European Commission, Sustainability
Impact Assessment, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/ global/sia/index-
en.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2005) ("The idea [of an SIA] is to identify the economic,
social and environmental impacts of any given trade agreement."). The Commis-
sion for Environmental Cooperation of North America, which was established ac-
cording to NAFTA's environmental side agreement, has also published several
studies documenting the ecological implications of NAFTA. See, e.g., COMMISSION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE 1 (2002), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ECONOMY/
symposium-e.pdf (presenting thirteen research papers dealing with a variety of
topics ranging from the environmental impact of NAFTA in local regions to the
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A second issue that such reform should focus on is expanding
the organizational setting in which the trade and environment
question is deliberated within the WTO (both in the context of ne-
gotiations and disputes). This should proceed by extending the
organizational ties between the WTO and environmental organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme
("UNEP") and MEAs' secretariats. These changes would create a
setting in which the various groups involved in this conflict could
converse and negotiate middle-ground responses to the difficult
dilemmas noted above. Extending the organizational relations be-
tween the two regimes can both improve the problem-solving ca-
pacities of the emerging (augmented) regime and increase its le-
gitimacy. More extensive institutional relations between the WTO
and environmental organizations could enhance the capacity of the
WTO legal system to cope with the difficult cognitive and deci-
sionmaking challenges that are likely to arise with the introduction
of stronger forms of linkage (manifested, for example by the need
to deal with increased number of trade-environment disputes).99
The real challenge lies in developing specific institutional mod-
ules, which would realize this vision, exploiting the varied institu-
tional strengths of the coupled regimes. Thus, for example, it makes
sense to keep intact the organizational framework of the WTO legal
system while finding ways to extend its decisionmaking capacities.
One option for realizing this idea would be to give environmental
organizations a more active role in the governance of the WTO. This
role should transcend the concept of mere "observer," which is cur-
rently discussed in the WTO. It could include, for example, giving
UNEP and key MEA secretariats full member rights at the WTO
Committee on Trade and the Environment and other relevant com-
mittees and a seat at the Appellate Body in cases that involve envi-
ronmental issues. Article XV, paragraph 2 of GATT, which re-
general issues relating to the linkage of trade and environmental policies). UNEP
has also done some work in this area. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF TRADE-
RELATED POLICIES, at iii (2001), available at http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/acts/
manpols/urlrmia.htm ("This Manual is designed to help policy makers and prac-
titioners ... to conduct integrated assessments of the economic, environmental and
social impacts of trade policy and trade liberalization."). It is clear, however, that
more can be done, especially in bringing such review mechanisms into the WTO
negotiating framework.
99 See generally PEREZ, supra note 10, at 49-114 (providing a more extensive
discussion of the institutional limitations of the WTO legal system).
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quires the contracting parties to consult with the IMF in cases that
involve, "problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of pay-
ments or foreign exchange arrangements" 100 could provide a possi-
ble blueprint for the incorporation of UNEP into the WTO deci-
sionmaking apparatus.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
The notion of linkage constitutes an interesting response to the
challenge of cross-regime sensitization. Designing workable
schemes of linkage, both in the trade-environment context and in
other domains, must take into account the conflicted discursive
space surrounding these domains and their idiosyncratic institu-
tional characteristics. Disregarding these intricate particulars
could not only erode the welfare benefits associated with cross-
regime linkage, but may also decrease the functional efficacy of the
associated regimes.
What are the prospects of more extensive uses of linkage pro-
jects in the trade-environment context? The Shrimp decision repre-
sents a bold, judicial attempt to extend the responsiveness of the
WTO to ecological concerns; it also recognizes the potential for
synergic linkage between the WTO and the environmental realm.
However, as was argued above, the Shrimp ruling constitutes only
a first step in this direction. Achieving greater synergy between
the trade-environment domains requires some preparatory organ-
izational moves, which will extend the institutional setting in
which trade and environmental dilemmas are being deliberated. A
broader institutional framework could serve as a platform for deal-
ing with the deep discursive frictions underlying the trade-
environment conflict and with the extensive administrative bur-
dens that are likely to accompany the linking process. 10 1
Unfortunately, at least from the perspective of the environ-
mental community, the bold vision of the Shrimp ruling has so far
failed to make an impact on the WTO's negotiation agenda. The
environmental part of the Doha negotiation framework, intro-
duced in the 2001 Doha Declaration, 10 2 is very modest in the targets
100 GATT art. 15, para. 2.
101 See Roberto A. Sanchez, Governance, Trade, and the Environment in the Con-
text of NAFTA, 45 Am. J. BEHAV. SCI. 1369, 1388 (2002) (discussing the lack of coop-
eration between the trade and environmental arms of the NAFTA agreement).
102 Negotiated in the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held at Doha,
Qatar in 2001. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of
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it sets out and even on these very limited targets, there are still
wide disagreements. There are three major items in the environ-
mental part of the Doha Declaration. The first item refers to "the
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obliga-
tions set out in multilateral environmental agreements." 103 The ne-
gotiations over this item dealt with the clarification of the relation-
ship and possible tension between trade measures taken under
MEAs and WTO rules. The question of whether the WTO's exces-
sive enforcement capacities or its status as a club-regime could be
used to enforce the various environmental obligations set out in
these agreements was not included in the Doha negotiation
framework. The second item focuses on establishing "procedures
for regular information exchange between MEA secretariats and
the relevant WTO committees" and on granting observer status to
certain MEAs.104 More radical ideas, such as granting UNEP (or
leading MEA secretariats) a formal voice in the decisionmaking
process within the WTO, were left out of the negotiation agenda.
No agreement was reached so far on any of these items.10 5 The only
negotiating item on which there seems to be a growing consensus,
is the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
environmental goods and services.106 While the idea of using the
WTO regime to promote production and distribution of ecologi-
cally friendly goods and services certainly fits the logic of "link-
age," the range of products that are currently projected to benefit
from this move is quite limited. 07
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
103 Id. art. 31(i).
104 Id. art. 31(ii).
105 For a detailed description of the status of the negotiations prior to the
Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, December 2005, see Committee on
Trade and Environment, Report by the Chairperson of the Special Session of the Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/12
(July 20, 2005) and the continuous coverage in Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest,
online at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly.
106 Doha Declaration, supra note 102, art. 31(iii).
107 There is still wide disagreement between Members about the proper defi-
nition of environmental goods: whether they should be limited, primarily, to
"end-of-pipe" technologies, or should also cover "green" processes or production
methods. One of the difficulties of the "end-use" approach is that its main benefi-
ciaries are likely to be the developed countries, which hold ninety percent of the
so-called traditional market of environmental goods. See Submission by Brazil,
Environmental Goods for Development, 5, TN/TE/W/59. A broader definition of
"green goods," which would embrace also products made through "green" pro-
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Unfortunately the Hong Kong summit ended without making
real progress on any of items on the Doha environmental
agenda.1 08 Prior to the summit several developing countries have
hinted that movement on some of the environmental items of the
Doha agenda (in particular the linkage between MEAs and the
WTO) will depend on achieving progress on other negotiating is-
sues, notably agriculture.10 9 However, these projected cross-sector
deals did not materialize, postponing a decision on the Doha envi-
ronmental items for future talks.
6. APPENDIX
I want to use this appendix to explore in further detail the link-
duction methods, including, for example, organic agricultural products and sus-
tainable forest products could extend the ecological impact of the proposed tariff
cuts and would also enable developing countries to reap some of the economic
benefits associated with them. See id. 8-13; Environmentally Preferable Products
(EPPs) as a Trade Opportunity for Developing Countries, UNCTAD/COM/70, Ge-
neva; SANDEEP SINGH, INT'L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR ENSURING WIN-
WIN OuTcOMES 6 (2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/trade-
environmental-goods.pdf. Recently India has proposed a different approach,
linking the proposed tariff cuts to specific projects, rather than a fixed list. For a
review of the different approaches, see Committee on Trade and Environment,
Special Session: Synthesis of Submissions on Environmental Goods- Informal Note by
the Secretariat, TN/TE/W/63 (Nov. 17, 2005). The Hong Kong Summit ended
without resolving this controversy. See World Trade Organization, Draft Ministe-
rial Declaration of 18 December 2005, 30, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2 (2005)
[hereinafter Draft Ministerial Declaration].
108 See Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 107, 30; see also Larry Elliott,
Lamy Calls on Blair to Broker Trade Deal, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 19, 2005, at 20.
This result stands in contrast to a recent speech by WTO Director General Pascal
Lamy, who signaled his agreement to some of the ideas raised in this Article.
Lamy noted, for example, the importance of a "continued dialogue with UNEP
and other organizations," the need for investing in regulatory tools such as "Sus-
tainability Impact Assessments," and the need to ensure that WTO rules and poli-
cies "do not frustrate the implementation of multilateral environmental protection
accords" and "strengthen the consensus on which they are based." While these
words are certainly consistent with the linkage thesis, the challenge, as noted
above, is to translate these abstract formulations into actual institutional modali-
ties. Pascal Lamy, Director General, WTO, Opening Address at the WTO Sympo-
sium on Trade and Sustainable Development within the Framework of Paragraph
51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (Oct. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/spple/sppl07_e.htm.
109 See CTE Moves on to Technical Discussions on Environmental Goods, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. Geneva, Switz.),
Sept. 21, 2005, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05- 09 -
21/BRIDGESWeekly9-31.pdf.
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age argument, using the tools of game theory. This exploration is
motivated by two key objectives: first, to give a better sense of the
game-theoretic argument, and second, to clarify my critique of this
argument -especially my critique regarding the importance of the
institutional and "transaction costs" factors. In particular I will
show how, by enriching the scenario that serves as the basis for the
model, it is possible to expose the shortcomings of the game theory
argument discussed in Section 2. The following model, which
builds on the work of Spagnolo,11° explores the idea of using link-
age as a mechanism for facilitating broader cooperation. The intui-
tion behind this idea is that linking two (or more) regimes could
allow countries to use the surplus enforcement power that may be
available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other
domains."'
This model is based on the following strategic situation: two
countries interacting over two policy issues. The interaction takes
the form of an iterated prisoner's dilemma ("PD") game. I will
consider first the single-shot game, and then move to discuss the
infinitely repeated interaction. Consider the game illustrated in
Table 1. In this game, state A is considering cooperating on some
aspect of its international relations, for example, trade, climate
change, ozone protection, arms control, or technology standards. I
focus on bilateral rather than multilateral punishment. If both
states cooperate on issue i, it is assumed that state A receives XAi,
state B receives XBi. If both states defect they receive NAi and NBi
respectively. If state A defects while state B cooperates, state A re-
ceives YAi and state B receives ZBi, while if state A cooperates while
state B defects, state A receives ZA and state B receives YBi.




Cooperate XAi, XBi ZAi,YBi
State A
Defect YAi, ZBi NAi, NBi
110 See Spagnolo, supra note 17.
111 The model explored in this section covers only one aspect of the argument
for the synergic potential of linkage and consequently captures only part of my
critique.
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The foregoing game is a prisoner's dilemma game when the
following is true (for A and B respectively): Yi > Xi > Ni > Zi. This
means that the preference schedule of the countries is the follow-
ing: defect, given that the other state is cooperating; cooperate,
given that the other state is cooperating; defect, given that the other
state is defecting; and cooperate, given that the other state is de-
fecting. A single-shot PD game has a unique solution in which
both players defect. This is determined by the structure of players'
preferences, which means that playing defect is a dominant strat-
egy, irrespective of the other player choices. The single-shot game
thus has a unique solution in which both players defect.
However, the single-shot version of the PD game does not cap-
ture the dynamics of international life in which countries interact
with each other over an indefinite period. The repeated PD game
has two important features. First, the strategies played by each
state at time t can be made conditional on the history of play up to
time t. Second, these strategies can include the possibility of pun-
ishment if a state deviates from the cooperative path. These two
features of infinitely repeated PD games create new strategic op-
tions for the parties. Some of these options, such as the strategies
of "tit-for-tat" or "grim-trigger," can support under some condi-
tions (relating, in particular, to the discount factor used by the par-
ties) the cooperative solution. The key for sustaining cooperation
in such games is the expectation of an ongoing relationship -the
shadow of the future.112
I do not intend to offer here a complete analysis of infinitely
repeated PD games. Let me just describe the intuition behind the
grim-trigger strategy, which I explore below. According to the
grim-trigger strategy, a player begins by cooperating in the first
period and continues to cooperate until a single defection by her
opponent, following which, the player defects forever. The grim-
trigger is thus a highly unforgiving strategy, because a single de-
fection brings about an eternal end to cooperation, in contrast to
the much more forgiving tit-for-tat.113 Generally a grim-trigger
strategy may support the cooperative outcome of infinitely re-
112 See generally Binmore, supra note 42; James S. Harvey, The Trust Paradox: A
Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness, 47 J. EcoN.
BEHAV. & ORG. 291, 292 (2002).
113 See generally Game Theory, at http://www.gametheory.net (last visited
Nov. 9, 2005), and, in particular, Grim Trigger Strategy, at
http://www.gametheory.net/ Dictionary/GrimTrigger.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2005) for a useful introduction to the concept of trigger strategies.
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peated PD games if the immediate gain from defecting is less than
the present value of all future lost payoffs that are expected from
the cooperative path, given the prevalent discount factor (which is
a proxy for how much the players care about the future). Using
the above notation, and assuming for simplicity that the parties are
symmetric and face an interest rate of r, the grim-trigger strategy
may support the cooperative outcome if:
(1) Yi- Xi < (Xi - Ni) / r114
Whether a grim-trigger strategy may succeed in securing coop-
eration depends, then, on three factors: the interest rate, the gain
from defection (Yi - Xi), and the projected loss from foregoing the
future gains from cooperation.
Consider now a scenario with two PD games of complete in-
formation with symmetric players, associated with different and
independent issues. Assume next, that in game i a grim-trigger
strategy supports a cooperative solution (that is, Yi - Xi < (Xi - Ni) /
r); whereas in game j, it does not (that is, Yj - Xj > (Xj - Nj)/r). In
what way can linkage help in such a case? Linkage can foster co-
operation by allowing the parties to invoke the surplus enforce-
ment power of regime i, that is, (Xi - Ni) / r - (Yi - Xi), to support
cooperation in the other regime, j. This could be achieved through
the invocation of a multi-game grim-trigger strategy, according to
which, a player begins by cooperating in both games in the first pe-
riod, and continues to cooperate in both until she detects a single
defection by her opponent (in either game or both), following which,
the player defects forever in both games. If the condition specified
below is satisfied, a player's best reply to the multi-game grim-
trigger strategy of the other players is the multi-game grim-trigger
strategy.
(2) (Yi- Xi) + (Yj - Xj) < (Xi - Ni) / r + (Xj - Nj) / r (a synergic
linkage)115
Note however that linkage can also destroy cooperation (irre-
spective of the issue of transaction costs, which will be discussed
114 The figure (Xi - Ni) / r reflects the present value of the stream of lost coop-
erative payoffs. It is the converged outcome of the infinite sum: (Xi - Ni) / (1 + r)
+ (Xi - Ni)/(1 + r)2+ (X, - Ni)/(1 + r)3 + ....
115 In other words, the surplus enforcement power of game i should be higher
than the surplus opportunistic potential of game j: (Y - X) - (Xj - N) / r < (Xi -
Ni) / r - (Yi - Xi).
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below) if instead of (2) the following condition is satisfied:
(3) (Yi - Xi) + (Yj - Xj) > (Xi - Ni) / r + (Xj - Nj) / r (a destructive
linkage)
This condition reflects the possibility that the surplus oppor-
tunistic potential of one of the regimes (that is, (Y - X) - (X - N) /
r), could outweigh the surplus enforcement power of the other re-
gime, making defection a dominant strategy in both regimes. In
such a scenario, linkage could destroy the cooperation in the re-
gime in which cooperation was originally supported by the grim-
trigger strategy, turning linkage into a destructive policy move.
The main point of the foregoing discussion was to clarify the
enforcement rationale of linking two regimes, as it was presented
in the game-theoretic literature. Consider now a more complex
setting, in which law has independent force and linkage has some
transaction costs. There are of course various ways in which one
can introduce these variables into a game. I propose the following
simple variation of Spagnolo's original setting. Consider the two
regimes, i and j, but only now defection cannot be detected by the
parties but by some exogenous agency -a judicial tribunal (with a
distinct tribunal acting in each regime).116 It is assumed that the
tribunals monitor the parties' behavior and announces, at the end
of each round of play, any defection.
1 17
Now assume that whereas within the original regimes the tri-
bunals could have detected perfectly any breach, this perfect ca-
pacity is not maintained once linkage is activated, and the tribunals
are merged into a new super-court. Let us further assume that the
newly merged tribunal is controlled by the legal team of one of the
original regimes, which has taken control of the integrated court.
The erosion of the court's monitoring capacity can be modeled by
assuming that the probability of detecting defection, within each of
the linked regimes decreases with the number of linked issues
116 The tribunal's existence and mode of action is part of the game structure
and is not endogenized as part of the game (although I will provide some hints as
to how this may be done). This hypothetical setting resembles the structure of the
WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.
117 Such a model fits a setting in which the players cannot assess their payoffs
in real time and depend on the tribunal's ruling. This scenario reflects a situation
in which the players recognize the hypothetical value of cooperation, but because
of limited cognitive capacities are unable to monitor the behavior of their coun-
terparts and thus can only assess their payoffs after several rounds of play. Such a
scenario fits complex interactions such as climate change negotiations, in which
the players depend on the superior cognitive capacities of a third party.
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(apart from the regime whose legal team controls the merged tri-
bunal, in which the probability of detection is assumed to remain
1.0 for simplicity). 118 This erosion, as will be illustrated below, re-
duces the potential synergy between the two regimes, by giving
more room for opportunistic behavior.
Consider a concrete example. Let us assume that n = 2; the
probability of detection in regime i, pi = 1; and the probability of
detection in regime j, pj = q.119 Let us assume, further, that the two
games satisfy condition (2), that is, they offer the possibility of syn-
ergic linkage. As before, knowing that the other state is committed
to using a multi-game grim-trigger strategy, each state needs to de-
termine whether multi-game grim-trigger strategy is a best reply;
that is, it needs to determine whether the immediate gain from de-
fection is larger than the present value of all future lost payoffs.
However, in this new setting the players must also take into ac-
count the fact that there is some probability that the merged tribu-
nal will not detect a defection in regime j, allowing the non-
cooperative player to escape punishment. This reasoning pattern
could lead, as will be demonstrated below, to the collapse of the
cooperative equilibrium.
To understand how this may unfold consider the following re-
vised multi-game grim-trigger strategy: in the first round of play,
defect in the second regime, j (the regime where p < 1) and cooper-
ate in the other (regime i); from the second round, play multi-game
grim-trigger strategy, using the tribunal declaration as a trigger for
activating punishment.120 The expected payoff-what one can
term the opportunistic function-of this country from defecting
(when playing against a party using the "normal" multi-game
grim-trigger strategy) is:
(4) M = [(Xi) + (Yj)] + (1 - q)[(Xi+ Xj) / r] + q[(Ni+ Nj) / r]
The first term reflects the one-off gain from defection in regime
j (added to the gain from cooperation in game i), the second term
reflects the potential gain from cooperation in both regimes given
the prospect of the tribunal not detecting the defection, and the last
118 However, in reality it seems reasonable to expect that some erosion will
take place in both regimes, since the increasing cognitive burdens are likely to
have negative effect on judicial performance in both regimes.
119 Therefore, in regime j, 1-q represents the probability of judicial mistake.
120 That is, if the court detects defection of either player, the player must play
defect infinitely. Otherwise, the player should play cooperate.
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term reflects the projected payoff given mutual activation of grim-
trigger strategy following a judicial detection. It can be shown eas-
ily that dM/ dq < 0; hence, M increases as q decreases. As before,
we want to determine whether defection is worthwhile, given the
prospects of punishment, only now punishment is uncertain. To
determine that, consider the prospective gain from cooperation:
(5) R = (Xi + Xj) + (Xi + Xj) / r
Defection is worthwhile if M > R or M - R > 0. After some re-
arrangement we get:
(6) (Yj - Xj) > q[(Xi - Ni) + (Xj - Nj)] / r
The meaning of (6) is that what had been a synergic linkage
could turn into a destabilized linked structure. The prospects of
such destabilization increase-the larger is the one-off gain from
defection in regime j, and the smaller is the probability of detec-
tion. For a certain utility structure we can derives a general condi-
tion for q, in which (6) will hold:
(7) q < r(Yj - Xj) / [(Xi - Ni)+(Xj - N)]
If (7) is satisfied, both players will be induced to adopt the re-
vised multi-game grim-trigger strategy leading to the collapse of
cooperation. 12' What the revised model illustrates, then, is that
once the model is enriched by incorporating some of the features of
"real" institutions -in this model, the possibility of erosion in the
institutional capacities of the merged court-linkage can actually
lead to the destruction of cooperation by extending the prospects
for opportunistic behavior.
121 What will happen when both players play the revised grim-trigger strat-
egy against each other? Starting with defection in both regimes will lead to the
activation of the grim-trigger strategy in the second round, unless the tribunal will
fail to detect both defections, the probability of which is (1 - q)2. In this (and only
this) case the players will continue cooperating, and the revised grim-trigger
strategy would not lead to the collapse of cooperation. The chance of such a sce-
nario depends on the size of q. If q is equal to 0.95, for example, the probability of a
concurrent judicial mistake is very small and amounts to 0.0025. Note that q may
in some cases foster cooperation, for example, when the surplus opportunistic po-
tential of one of the linked regimes is very big. In such cases the court's error may
cover the players' opportunistic "slip," enabling them to continue cooperating in
the next stages.
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